It is a little alarming if passports are to be readable
and unencrypted at a distance without the holder knowing. There are all
sorts of criminal opportunities. A scan of outgoing passengers could be made
to produce a list of burglary targets. Just knowing where people are going
must be good for espionage, marital infidelity investigation, papparazzi
hassles etc. A little bit of advance information would be good to set up
mugging opportunities or tourist scams etc.
From
The Economist
At America's insistence, passports are about to get their biggest overhaul
since they were introduced. They are to be fitted with computer chips that
have been loaded with digital photographs of the bearer (so that the process
of comparing the face on the passport with the face on the person can be
automated), digitised fingerprints and even scans of the bearer's irises,
which are as unique to people as their fingerprints.
A sensible precaution in a dangerous world, perhaps. But there is cause for
concern. For one thing, the data on these chips will be readable remotely,
without the bearer knowing. And—again at America's insistence—those data
will not be encrypted, so anybody with a suitable reader, be they official,
commercial, criminal or terrorist, will be able to check a passport holder's
details. To make matters worse, biometric technology—as systems capable of
recognising fingerprints, irises and faces are known—is still less than
reliable, and so when it is supposed to work, at airports for example, it
may not. Finally, its introduction has been terribly rushed, risking further
mishaps. The United Sates want the thing to start running by October, at
least in those countries for whose nationals it does not demand visas.
The idea is similar to that of the radio-frequency identification (RFID)
tags that are coming into use by retailers, to identify their stock, and
mass-transit systems, to charge their passengers. Dig deeper, though, and
problems start to surface. One is interoperability. In mass-transit RFID
cards, the chips and readers are designed and sold as a package, and even in
the case of retailing they are carefully designed to be interoperable. In
the case of passports, they will merely be designed to a vague common
standard. Each country will pick its own manufacturers, in the hope that its
chips will be readable by other people's machines, and vice versa.
That may not happen in practice. In a trial conducted in December at
Baltimore International Airport, three of the passport readers could manage
to read the chips accurately only 58%, 43% and 31% of the time, according to
confidential figures reported in Card Technology magazine, which covers the
chip-embedded card industry. (An official at America's Department of
Homeland Security confirmed that “there were problems”.)
A second difficulty is the reliability of biometric technology.
Facial-recognition systems work only if the photograph is taken with proper
lighting and an especially bland expression on the face. Even then, the
error rate for facial-recognition software has proved to be as high as 10%
in tests. If that were translated into reality, one person in ten would need
to be pulled aside for extra screening. Fingerprint and iris-recognition
technology have significant error rates, too. So, despite the belief that
biometrics will make crossing a border more efficient and secure, it could
well have the opposite effect, as false alarms become the norm.
The third, and scariest problem, however, is one that is deliberately built
into the technology, rather than being an accident of its present
inefficiency. This is the remote-readability of the chip, combined with the
lack of encryption of the data held on it. Passport chips are deliberately
designed for clandestine remote reading. The ICAO specification refers quite
openly to the idea of a “walk-through” inspection with the person concerned
“possibly being unaware of the operation”. The lack of encryption is also
deliberate—both to promote international interoperability and to encourage
airlines, hotels and banks to join in. Big Brother, then, really will be
watching you. And others, too, may be tempted to set up clandestine
“walk-through inspections where the person is possibly unaware of the
operation”. Criminals will have a useful tool for identity theft. Terrorists
will be able to know the nationality of those they attack.
Belatedly, the authorities have recognised this problem, and are trying to
do something about it. The irony is that this involves eliminating the
remote readability that was envisaged to