From the Iran
Press Service
After a period of some tolerance under former president Mohammad Khatami,
Iran is now experiencing a cultural clampdown. President Mahmoud Ahmadi
Nezhad is implementing the hardest of hardline ideological tendencies in the
cultural arena, consistent with his belief that his administration should
prepare the country for the reappearance of the hidden imam (who is now more
than a thousand years old). To this end, Ahmadi Nezhad has taken a host of
provocative steps regarding:
The Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance. The new minister, Mohammad
Hossein Saffar Harandi, was a member of the Revolutionary Guard. In his
position as deputy editor of the hardline “Kayhan” newspaper, Harandi wrote
many articles condemning democracy as a Western model for governing,
pluralism as an “effective weapon of the West to achieve their cultural
invasion into Islamic world”, and freedom of speech as a way to destroy
people’s religious beliefs.
The Supreme Cultural Revolution Council (SCRC). In its first session under
Ahmadi Nezhad, the SCRC adopted a circular banning all movies that propagandize for schools like secularism, liberalism, nihilism, or feminism,
and destroy the authentic cultures of religious societies and humiliate
them. The circular emphasizes that all movies that explicitly or
implicitly deny the right of religion to govern, or that show secular
regimes as superior to their religious counterparts, are forbidden. Many
Iranian directors, like Bahram Bayza’i, experience delays lasting into years
receiving permission to produce films, and many others, like Abbas
Kiarostami, cannot show their work in Iran. Some Iranian filmmakers, like
Mohsen Makhmalbaf, prefer to live abroad in order to pursue their art in
freedom and safety.
Journalism. Masha’allah Shamsolva’ezin, spokesman for the Tehran-based
Association for Advocating Freedom of Press, said that state pressure on
journalists has increased since Ahmadi Nezhad took office. According to
Shamsolvaezin, the culture ministry, in cooperation with intelligence and
security forces, has in recent weeks called in many journalists for
questioning without apparent reasons.
The goal clearly is to intimidate them. Many of those pressing journalists
are former employees of the Ministry of Intelligence who were fired under
Khatami for their involvement in killing intellectuals and political
activists. Instead of arresting journalists and sending them to Evin Prison,
Tehran seeks to reduce international notice of its intimidation of
journalists and political activists by putting psychological pressure on
them. Even the families of victims are threatened against speaking about the
intimidation.
Book publishing. The process of issuing permission to publish books of
literature and the human sciences has practically ground to a halt. All
books, even Qor’ans, must receive official permission for publication from
the culture ministry. Writers and publishers say that the censorship
regulations have become stricter since Harandi took over the ministry. The
young writer Hossein Sanapoor, for example, opted not to publish his planned
book of short stories because censors asked him to eliminate four stories
that, taken together, represented the majority of the book.
Musical performances. Since September, the Culture Ministry has cancelled
more than thirty concerts. The ministry has also announced the cancellation
of the Fajr Music Festival on the grounds that it would overlap with the
period of Moharram, the mourning ceremonies for the Shi’ite third imam, but
after seeing the extent of public dissatisfaction and its negative impact on
Ahmadi Nezhad’s image, the ministry allowed the festival to take place at a
later date. The rescheduled festival will differ from recent years, though,
focusing on religious music.
Restrictions on women. Since Ahmadi Nezhad’s election, conservatives have
been campaigning to impose a single national dress code for women.
Parliamentarians have introduced numerous proposals for defining “national
dress,” which would oblige all women in state offices, universities, and
other public places to wear a unique “Islamic” costume.
University curricula. Ahmadi Nezhad has promised to Islamize the
universities. Ten university presidents have quit or have been dismissed as
a result. In early November, the new minister of Sciences, Research, and
Technology, Mohammad Mehdi Zahidi, went to Qom, where the clergy urged him
to cleanse the universities of “enemies of the Islamic revolution” and to
incorporate religion into all levels of education. In Iran’s universities,
this would mean making fundamental modifications to the content of textbooks
to make them compatible with religious tradition; erasing Western culture
from textbooks; and forcing women to study in their native cities in order
to maintain their morals by being in the family home.
University dress codes. On the first day of the current academic year,
security agents handed university students a flower and an announcement.
Students were urged to respect Islamic values, specifically including a
detailed dress code for women, asking them to prefer a chador (a gown
covering the full body) or to wear a simple long coat in a dark color.
Perfumes and cosmetics are not to be used. Male students should wear
loose-fitting, long-sleeved shirts that cannot be thought to follow
Western culture or other banal cultures. The announcement concludes with
a warning that students who disrespect the recommendations will be punished
in accordance with university rules.
The National Youth Organization. Ahmadi Nezhad has appointed Ali Akbari to
head the National Youth Organization, a state organization that has a large
budget and enormous authority over government and nongovernmental
organizations related to youth affairs. Under Akbari’s leadership, the
National Youth Organization is working closely with the Basij militia and
other military organizations to advance radical propaganda.
Ahmadi Nezhad’s cultural strategy is to trust influential positions and
institutional responsibilities either to former Revolutionary Guard
commanders or to young radical clerics. The president’s cadre of reactionary
apparatchiks seek to control cultural production and creativity more than
ever before in the history of Islamic Republic—but this does not mean that
Iranian society will surrender.
Despite great pressure, increasing restrictions, and the threat of
punishment, underground culture has dominated Iran’s social and cultural
scene for some years now. The gap between young people and the government is
growing wider and deeper. Despite the regime’s many mechanisms for keeping
the Iranian people closed off from the world, Iranian youths are more
Westernized now than at any other time in contemporary history.